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A B S T R A C T
Truth tellers sound more plausible than lie tellers. Plausibility ratings do not require much time or cognitive resources, 
but a disadvantage is that it is measured subjectively on Likert scales. The aim of the current paper was to understand 
if plausibility can be predicted by three other verbal veracity cues that can be measured objectively by counting their 
frequency of occurrence: details, complications, and verifiable sources. If these objective cues could predict plausibility, 
observers could be instructed to pay attention to them when judging plausibility, which would make plausibility ratings 
somewhat more objective. We therefore re-analysed five existing datasets; all of them included plausibility, details and 
complications and two of them also verifiable sources as dependent variables. Plausibility was positively correlated with 
all three other tested cues, but mostly predicted by complications and verifiable sources, explaining on average almost 
40% of the variance. Plausibility showed larger effect sizes in distinguishing truth tellers from lie tellers than the three 
other cues, perhaps because the plausibility cue consists of multiple components (complications and verifiable sources). 
Research has shown that the cues that showed the strongest relationship with veracity typically consisted of multiple 
components.
La credibilidad: ¿señal verbal de veracidad que vale la pena analizar?
R E S U M E N
Las personas que dicen la verdad suenan más creibles que las mentirosas. La valoración de la credibilidad no necesita mucho 
tiempo ni recursos cognitivos, aunque tenga la desventaja de que se mide subjetivamente en escalas Likert. El objetivo de este 
trabajo es saber si la credibilidad puede predecirse mediante pistas de veracidad verbal que puede medirse objetivamente 
contando la frecuencia de ocurrencia: detalles, complicaciones y fuentes verificables. Si estas pistas cognitivas pudieran pre-
decir la credibilidad se podría instruir a los observadores a que les presten atención al valorar la credibilidad, lo que haría que 
esta fuera algo más objetiva. Con esta intención reanalizamos cinco conjuntos de datos, todos los cuales incluían credibilidad, 
detalles y complicaciones y dos de ellos además fuentes verificables como variables dependientes. La credibilidad correlacio-
naba positivamente con las otras tres pistas que se probaron, predicha sobre todo por las complicaciones y las fuentes veri-
ficables, que explicaban de media casi el 40% de la varianza. La credibilidad mostró tamaños de efecto al distinguir personas 
que decían la verdad de las que mentían mayores que las otras tres pistas, tal vez porque la señal de plausibilidad tiene varios 
componentes (complicaciones y fuentes verificables). Según la investigación, las pistas con una relación más estrecha con la 







Plausibility: A Verbal Cue to Veracity worth Examining?
Aldert Vrija, Haneen Deeba, Sharon Leala, Pär-Anders Granhagb, and Ronald P. Fisherc
aUniversity of Portsmouth; bUniversity of Gothenburg, Sweden; cFlorida International University
Cite this article as: Vrij, A., Deeb, H., Leal, S., Granhag, P. A., & Fisher, R. P. (2020). Plausibility: A verbal cue to veracity worth examining? The European Journal of Psychology Applied 
to Legal Context. Ahead of print. https://doi.org/10.5093/ejpalc2021a4      
This study was funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (ESRC Award: ES/N009614/1).
Correspondence: aldert.vrij@port.ac.uk (S. Leal)1.
Plausibility: A Verbal Cue to Veracity worth Examining?
In 2003 Bella DePaulo et colleagues (DePaulo et al. (2003) 
published their meta-analysis examining nonverbal and verbal cues 
to deceit. It included 120 samples examining 158 cues. Fifty out of 
these 158 cues were examined more than five times, including 
plausibility, which was examined nine times. Plausibility was 
significantly related to veracity with truth tellers’ stories sounding 
more plausible than lie tellers’ stories. Although the effect size was 
small (d = 0.23), it was larger than the effect sizes of most other cues. 
In fact, plausibility emerged as the eighth strongest indicator in the 
list of 50 cues (DePaulo et al., 2003, Table 8).
Given that plausibility was more strongly related to veracity than 
most other verbal cues, someone would expect researchers to have 
included plausibility in the set of verbal cues they examine when 
assessing veracity. This did not happen. To date at least six frequently 
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cited verbal veracity assessment protocols exist, but in five of them 
plausibility is not included: Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception 
(ACID; Colwell et al., 2013; Colwell et al., 2007); Criteria-based Content 
Analysis (CBCA; Amado et al., 2016; Köhnken, 2004; Köhnken & Steller, 
1988); Cognitive Credibility Assessment (CCA; Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2017; 
Vrij et al., 2015); the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE; Granhag & Hartwig, 
2015; Hartwig, et al., 2014); and the Verifiability Approach (VA; Nahari 
& Vrij, 2014; Vrij & Nahari, 2019). Plausibility is sometimes included 
in one tool, Reality Monitoring (RM; Masip et al., 2005; Sporer, 2004; 
Sporer et al., 2020), under the term ‘realism’. In a recent study (Sporer 
et al., 2020, study 2) plausibility emerged as the strongest indicator of 
veracity out of the eight RM cues that were examined.
We do not know why other researchers do not include plausibility 
in their protocols, but for us subjectivity of coding is the main 
reason to exclude it. Subjectivity means that we cannot explain 
to practitioners how to use plausibility as a verbal veracity cue. 
However, ignoring plausibility could be considered a shortcoming, 
not only because research has shown that plausibility has potential 
as a veracity assessment cue but also because in our conversations 
with practitioners about verbal cues to deception they frequently 
ask us about this cue. Against this background we decided to start 
examining plausibility in more detail, resulting in the current project 
which should be seen as a first step. In the current project we explored 
to what extent plausibility could be predicted by verbal cues that are 
coded more objectively and that discriminate truth tellers from lie 
tellers according to research. If plausibility could be predicted by such 
cues, we would be one step closer to making the concept of statement 
plausibility more objective. That is, observers could be instructed to 
consider these objective cues when judging plausibility.
We checked our datasets and found five in which we examined 
plausibility and two other verbal cues we thought may be related to 
it: total details and complications (Deeb, Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020; Leal et 
al., 2019; Leal et al. 2015; Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020; Vrij, Leal, Fisher, 
et al., 2020). In two of these datasets (Leal et al., 2019; Vrij, Leal, Deeb, 
et al. 2020) an additional cue was examined which we also thought to 
have potential in explaining plausibility: verifiable sources.
DePaulo et al. (2003) defined plausibility as “the degree to which 
the message seems plausible, likely, or believable” (p. 113). Another 
definition used in the literature that avoids the word ‘plausible’ in 
its definition is “how likely it is that the activities happened in the 
way described” (Leal et al., 2019, p. 278). To judge how likely it is that 
activities happened in the way they are described, it is useful to take 
contextual information into account. Contextual information can 
be present in at least two forms (Blair et al., 2010). First, statements 
can be compared with independent evidence such as CCTV footage 
(statements that contradict independent evidence are considered 
implausible). This is a compelling way to detect deception (Vrij 
& Fisher, 2016) and the SUE technique is based on this principle 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). However, this use of plausibility is 
possible only when independent evidence is available, which is not 
always the case. Second, statements can be judged in terms of what 
is conventional or reasonable in a given situation (unconventional or 
unreasonable activities are considered implausible). Someone can 
always make this type of comparison and it has shown good potential 
for lie detection. Blair et al. (2010) conducted a series of experiments 
in which some participants were given contextual information (e.g., 
being told that the questions were very difficult to answer prior to 
deciding whether someone with a high score had cheated in a test), 
whereas other participants were not given contextual information. 
Observers who received contextual information performed better in 
detecting truths and lies (75%) than observers who did not receive 
such information (57%). However, comparing a statement against the 
“conventional” or “reasonable” could become subjective if observers 
disagree on what is conventional or reasonable.
The objective verbal cues we considered were details, 
complications, and verifiable sources. Details refer to the meaningful 
units of information in a statement. Truth tellers typically report 
more details than lie tellers (Amado et al., 2016). Lie tellers lack the 
cognitive resources to fabricate enough details (Köhnken, 2004) 
or are unwilling to report many details out of fear that the details 
they provide result in leads to investigators (Nahari et al., 2014). A 
complication is an occurrence that affects the story teller and makes 
a situation more complex (“The air conditioning was not working 
properly in the hotel, which made the room far too hot.”) Truth 
tellers typically report more complications than lie tellers (Amado 
et al., 2016). Making up complications requires cognitive resources, 
but lie tellers may not have adequate cognitive resources to do so 
(Köhnken, 2004). Besides, adding complications makes the story 
more complex, which conflicts with lie tellers’ inclination to keep 
their stories simple (Hartwig et al., 2007). The fear that the provided 
information results in leads for investigators also results in lie tellers 
reporting fewer verifiable sources than truth tellers (Leal et al., 
2019). Verifiable sources refer to sources mentioned in a statement 
that could be consulted to check the veracity of a statement, such as 
named witnesses, receipts, and CCTV footage. 
All three cues may be related to statement plausibility. Regarding 
details, people typically underestimate forgetting (Harvey et al., 
2019; Koriat et al., 2004; Kornell & Bjork, 2009), which means that 
they expect others to be able to provide many details when they 
are asked to provide a detailed account of an activity. Therefore, a 
detailed account of an activity will be considered plausible and an 
account that provides few details will be considered unconventional 
and therefore implausible. Complications frequently occur (Vrij, 
Mann, et al., 2020; Vrij & Vrij, 2020) and observers will remember 
similar experiences when other people report them. This will make 
their stories sound plausible. The absence of complications in an 
account will be seen as an abnormally smooth report of an activity. 
People are often able to back up their activities with evidence. That 
is, they have met a named person, there is footage of the activity 
(CCTV or photos), the activity is documented (use of phone, 
bank cards, receipts), etc. Activities will thus be considered more 
plausible when such verifiable sources are reported. Activities that, 
according to the interviewee’s account, took place in a vacuum of 
evidence will be considered less plausible.
Method
We re-analysed five datasets (Deeb, Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020; Leal 
et al., 2019; Leal et al., 2015; Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. 2020; Vrij, Leal, 
Fisher, et al., 2020). In all five datasets, details, complications, and 
plausibility were examined, and in two datasets (Leal et al., 2019; 
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al., 2020) also verifiable sources were examined. 
In all five experiments plausibility was defined as “how likely it is 
that the activities happened in the way described” and was measured 
subjectively on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (implausible) to 
7 (plausible). Details, complications and verifiable sources were 
counted objectively through their frequency of occurrence. We note 
that strictly speaking these measurements are still not objective. 
Someone has to define those variables and they then should be coded 
according to this definition. However, this coding is more objective 
than the Likert scale coding used for plausibility. We used the 
variables as they appeared in the datasets, so no additional coding 
was carried out for this article. However, some dependent variables 
were merged for the purpose of this article. See Appendix for more 
information.
In Deeb, Vrij, Leal, et al. (2020), truth tellers told the truth about 
a significant event they experienced in the past two years whereas 
lie tellers pretended to have experienced a similar event. In Leal 
et al. (2019) and Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. (2020), truth tellers told 
the truth about a trip they made in the last 12 months, whereas 
lie tellers pretended to have made such a trip. In Leal et al. (2015), 
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truth tellers discussed a truthful experience of a theft, loss or 
damage, whereas lie tellers fabricated such experiences. In Vrij, 
Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020), truth tellers told the truth about a trip they 
were going to make (intended trip), whereas lie tellers made up 
such a story. The number of participants in the studies were 243 in 
Deeb, Vrij, Leal, et al. (2020), 83 in Leal et al. (2015), 150 in Leal et 
al. (2019), 208 in Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020), and 201 in Vrij, Leal, 
Fisher, et al. (2020). In all five experiments, manipulations other 
than veracity took place and they were included as covariates in 
the current analyses (see Appendix). In addition, Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et 
al.’s (2020) experiment was carried out in three different countries 
and ‘country’ was also included as a covariate in the analyses.
Results
Plausibility as a Diagnostic Verbal Cue to Veracity
Table 1, final column, shows that plausibility could be measured 
reliably in all five studies. For each of the five datasets, analyses 
of covariance were conducted with veracity as the independent 
variable, manipulations other than veracity as covariates, and details, 
complications, verifiable sources, and plausibility as dependent 
variables. Table 1 shows the results for the five experiments. In all five 
experiments, truth tellers’ statements came across as significantly 
more plausible than lie tellers’ statements. The effect sizes for 
plausibility were large in all experiments and ranged from d = 0.71 
to d = 1.18. In all five experiments, truth tellers reported significantly 
more complications than lie tellers, and the effect sizes ranged from 
small (d = 0.35) to large (d = 0.88). In four of the five experiments, 
truth tellers reported significantly more details than lie tellers, and 
the effect sizes ranged from small (d = 0.33) to medium/large (d = 
0.59). Also, truth tellers reported more verifiable sources than lie 
tellers but this effect was significant in only one study (p = .066 in the 
other study), and the effect sizes were small (d = 0.31) to large (d = 
0.78). Taken together, the findings for plausibility and complications 
were the most consistent across the five experiments, and plausibility 
emerged as the most diagnostic cue to predict veracity (largest 
d-scores). 
Table 1 shows that in all five studies, moderate correlations 
emerged between plausibility and the remaining variables and all 
in the expected direction: increased plausibility was correlated 
with increased numbers of details, complications, and verifiable 
sources.
Verbal Cues that Predict Plausibility
Table 2 shows the results from the linear regression analyses for 
all five experiments. A forced entry method was used with details, 
complications, and verifiable sources as predictors and plausibility as 
the outcome variable. When verifiable sources were not included as 
predictors in the analyses, complications and details explained 25% 
to 48% of the variance. Complications contributed more than details 
to the model in two experiments (Leal et al., 2019; Leal et al., 2015). 
In Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020), details (b = .33, p < .001) contributed 
more than complications (b= .30, p < .001) to the model, but this 
difference was negligible. In the remaining two studies (Deeb, Vrij, 
Leal, et al., 2020; Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al., 2020), only complications 
contributed to the model.
When verifiable sources was included as a predictor in the 
regression, 41% to 60% of the variance was explained. Verifiable 
sources contributed to explaining the model’s variance, either more 
than details or more than both details and complications. These 
results demonstrate that complications and verifiable sources better 
predict plausibility than details.
Table 1. Inferential Statistics in the Five Experiments as a Function of Veracity
Study and variables Truth Lie
F p d r1 p ICC2
M SD CI M SD CI
Leal et al. (2015). Experiment 2
Details 36.15 24.17 29.60, 42.45 29.69 22.36 23.46, 36.17 01.87 .176   0.27 [-0.19, 0.67] .41 [.21, .57] < .001 .86
Complications 00.37 00.49 00.23, 00.50 00.17 00.38 00.03, 00.30 04.28 .042 0.46 [0.01, 0.89] .42 [.23, .59] < .001 .53
Plausibility 04.50 01.05 04.21, 04.79 03.59 00.85 03.30, 03.88 19.58 < .001 0.95 [0.49, 1.39] .71
Leal et al. (2019)
Details 39.16 17.89 35.60, 42.34 31.47 11.86 28.33, 34.99 9.28 .003 0.51 [0.18, 0.83] .58 [.47, .68] < .001 .69
Complications 06.50 05.64 05.48, 07.49 02.64 02.58 01.67, 03.65 28.65 < .001 0.88 [0.54, 1.21] .63 [.53, .72] < .001 .76
Plausibility 04.57 01.16 04.33, 04.79 03.87 00.84 03.65, 04.10 17.54 < .001 0.71 [0.39, 1.01] .78
Verifiable sources 01.55 01.71 01.19, 01.89 01.07 01.37 00.73, 01.43 03.44 .066  0.31 [-0.02, 0.63] .43 [.29, .56] < .001 .95
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020). Experiment 2
Details 46.32 24.95 42.37, 50.43 33.99 16.22 30.00, 37.83 19.19 < .001 0.59 [0.30, 0.86] .48 [.37, .58] < .001 .98
Complications 00.62 00.90 00.46, 00.79 00.32 00.80 00.16, 00.48 06.90 .009 0.35 [0.07, 0.62] .47 [.35, .57] < .001 .78
Plausibility 03.94 01.47 03.67, 04.20 02.68 01.24 02.42, 02.94 44.82 < .001 0.93 [0.63, 1.20] .78
Verifiable sources 03.37 02.61 02.97, 03.77 01.94 01.34 01.55, 02.33 25.09 < .001 0.78 [0.49, 1.05] .52 [.42, .61] < .001 .55
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. (2020)
Details 98.41 62.17 87.41, 109.49 80.07 49.31 69.37, 90.69 05.60 .019 0.33 [0.04, 0.60] .48 [.36, .58] < .001 .72
Complications 08.61 09.23 07.12, 10.11 05.40 05.72 03.96, 06.84 09.37 .003 0.42 [0.14, 0.69] .55 [.44, .64] < .001 .92
Plausibility 04.71 01.45 04.44, 04.98 03.63 01.37 03.36, 03.89 32.42 < .001 0.77 [0.47, 1.04] .75
Deeb et al. (2020)
Details 157.40 130.55 139.34, 175.57 108.63 60.48   90.38, 126.77 14.07 < .001 0.48 [0.22, 0.74] .39 [.28, .49] <.001 .70
Complications   08.10 11.43 06.58, 09.62   03.08 03.56 01.56, 04.60 21.18 < .001 0.59 [0.33, 0.85] .51 [.41, .59] <.001 .95
Plausibility   04.90 01.04 04.72, 05.08   03.70 00.99 03.52, 03.88 84.88 < .001 1.18 [0.91, 1.46] .81
Note. 1Two-tailed correlational tests were carried out between plausibility and the other variables (details, complications, verifiable sources) as the hypotheses were exploratory. 
We report Pearson’s correlation coefficient r and the corresponding confidence intervals for each verbal cue.
2In Leal et al. (2015) interrater reliability of plausibility was measured through five judges. The statistic represents Cronbach’s alpha. In the other studies interrrater reliability 
for plausability and all other variables were measured through two judges and the statistic represents intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) using the two-way random effects 
model measuring consistency. 
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Table 2. Output of the Regression Analyses that Tested the Contribution of 
Details, Complications, and Verifiable Sources in Explaining Plausibility
Study and Variables R R2 b t p
Leal et al. (2015). Experiment 2
.50 .25
Details .29 2.76 .007
Complications .31 3.00 .004
Leal et al. (2019)
.70 .48
Details .34 4.87 < .001
Complications .45 6.43 < .001
.78 .60
Details .30 4.81 < .001
Complications .44 7.05 < .001
Verifiable sources .35 6.52 < .001
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020). Experiment 2
.55 .30
Details .33 4.91 < .001
Complications .30 4.46 < .001
.64 .41
Details .17 2.45    .015
Complications .30 4.75 < .001
Verifiable sources .38 6.27 < .001
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. (2020)
.55 .31
Details .13 1.32     .187
Complications .45 4.70  < .001
Deeb et al. (2020)
.51 .26
Details .04 0.43    .671
Complications .48 5.79 < .001
Discussion
Plausibility was positively correlated with details, complications, 
and verifiable sources but was mostly predicted by complications 
and verifiable sources. These cues explained 37.29% of the variance 
(average of the seven R2 reported in Table 2), which means that we 
succeeded to some extent in making the concept plausibility more 
objective. However, it also means that the remaining 62.71% should 
be explained by other cues. We believe that contextual information 
about what is the convention in a given situation may account for at 
least some of the unexplained variance as research has shown (Blair 
et al., 2010; Masip & Herrero, 2015). To take an example from one of 
our own datasets, a businessman travelling from Tokyo to Barcelona 
pretended to go to Barcelona for a weekend break. He gave a detailed 
account of which attractions he was going to visit in Barcelona and 
where he would stay; he provided complications on the planning 
phase of the trip, and he could present his hotel reservation as 
evidence. Despite this, his story did not seem plausible because he 
said he would stay in Barcelona for less than 48 hours. A return trip 
Tokyo-Barcelona for less than 48 hours just for sightseeing sounds 
implausible. In a similar vein is the story of the two Russian men 
suspected of poisoning a former Russian military officer and double 
agent for the UK intelligence services in Salisbury in England (Roth 
& Dodd, 2018). They said they travelled from Moscow to the UK for a 
43 hours trip to visit the Salisbury cathedral. That is an odd purpose 
for a trip from Moscow to the UK, even more so because they stayed 
in a London hotel. Why not staying in a Salisbury hotel if that was 
their final destination? Their story did not seem plausible even if they 
would have given many details, complications, and verifiable sources 
in their interview.
Using total details as a possible predictor for plausibility may 
be another reason as to why a substantial amount of variance 
remained unexplained. Total details is a rough measure that gives 
all details equal weight. In reality some details may be more 
important to explain plausibility than others. This would resemble 
the Model Statement findings. A Model Statement is an example 
of a detailed account unrelated to the topic of investigation (Leal 
et al., 2015). It raises expectations amongst both truth tellers and 
lie tellers to provide more information (Ewens et al., 2016). As a 
result, total details does not discriminate truth tellers from lie tellers 
after exposure to a Model Statement (Vrij et al., 2018). However, 
rather than the quantity of details it is the quality of details that 
discriminates truth tellers from lie tellers after being exposed to a 
Model Statement. For example, differences between truth tellers 
and lie tellers arise in reporting core or peripheral details (Leal et 
al., 2018) and in reporting complications (Deeb, Vrij, & Leal, 2020; 
Vrij, Leal et al., 2017). This quantity versus quality of detail argument 
may also influence plausibility ratings. The distinction between 
core and peripheral details may also be relevant for plausibility 
ratings, and perhaps statements that focus on core information are 
considered to be more plausible. In addition, the verbal deception 
literature contains a wealth of details (other than complications) 
that discriminate truth tellers from lie tellers (Amado et al., 2016). 
Researchers could start examining such details.
Statement plausibility was a diagnostic cue to veracity in all 
five experiments, and it showed larger effect sizes than the other 
three objectively assessed verbal cues: details, complications, and 
verifiable sources. A relatively strong performance from plausibility in 
discriminating between truth tellers and lie tellers was also found in 
Sporer et al. (2020) and in DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis. That 
plausibility is predicted by multiple cues (complications, verifiable 
sources, and probably also contextual information) may explain why 
it showed the largest effect sizes. Assessing statements based on a 
combination of diagnostic cues (complications and verifiable sources 
in the current research) is more likely to enhance lie detection than 
assessments based on individual cues (DePaulo et al., 2003; DePaulo 
& Morris, 2004; Hartwig & Bond, 2014). Of course, we cannot rule out 
that even more cues, not examined in the current five experiments, 
contribute to plausibility ratings. It probably is a verbal cue that 
consists of more components than many other verbal cues.
The strong performance of plausibility in distinguishing truth 
tellers from lie tellers makes it an attractive verbal cue. In addition, 
given how difficult and time-consuming it is to count objective 
cues such as details, complications, and verifiable sources, rating 
statement plausibility on a Likert scale may save time as well as 
cognitive resources. This is crucial for investigative practitioners who 
are frequently under pressure to resolve cases rapidly (Horgan, 2014). 
The question arises whether the subjective nature of plausibility 
is worth a price paying. We think that at present using plausibility 
as a veracity assessment is premature and advocate against its use. 
However, we think that plausibility deserves more attention from 
researchers than it currently attracts.
In terms of research, first, we encourage deception researchers 
to start including plausibility as a cue in their research to further 
test its diagnostic value but also to examine which objective cues 
can explain plausibility. The latter results could lead to a more 
objective way to measure statement plausibility. Second, in the five 
experiments discussed in this article, plausibility was always defined 
as “how likely it is that the activities happened in the way described”. 
Research could examine whether providing observers with different 
definitions of plausibility would lead to different results. For example, 
would the definition “how likely it is that the category of activity 
that is described in this statement generally happens in the way 
described” lead to different results? Based on the current findings the 
definition “how likely the overall statement includes complications 
and verifiable sources given the context” is worth examining.
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Third, the five experiments in this paper used samples of college 
students or community members. It may be useful to examine 
plausibility among forensic suspects. Suspects and inmates 
typically do not provide detailed statements and prefer to keep their 
stories simple, but at the same time, they strive to sound plausible 
(Alison et al., 2014; Strömwall & Willén, 2011). Suspects also have 
more insight into people’s beliefs about deception and may use 
countermeasures effectively to mimic truth tellers’ responses, but 
they are not necessarily successful in all their attempts (Deeb et 
al., 2018; Granhag et al., 2004; Rosenfeld, 2018; Vrij, Leal, Fisher, 
et al., 2020). For example, asking lie tellers to provide verifiable 
details does not make lie tellers more forthcoming with respect to 
verifiable information as that may incriminate them (Nahari et al., 
2014). Future research could examine how successful real suspects 
are when instructed (or not) to provide plausible statements, which 
we have shown to be partially based on verifiable information.
Fourth, future research could examine true statements that 
attract low plausibility ratings and false statements that attract 
high plausibility ratings. Is there something beyond different types 
of detail that triggers those incorrect plausibility ratings? For 
example, are rare events seen as implausible regardless of their 
veracity? And are statements that are considered to be against 
someone’s self-interest seen as implausible regardless of their 
veracity?
We think there is a large set of questions to be examined in 
relation to plausibility and that it is worthwhile to pursue them 
given that plausibility seems to be a relatively strong veracity 
indicator and practitioners frequently ask questions about it. We 
hope that this article will start research and discussions about the 
relationship between plausibility and veracity.
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Appendix
The Selected Variables and Manipulations in the Five Experiments
Leal et al. (2015). Experiment 2
Dependent variables
Details refers to the total number of visual and contextual details reported during the interview.
Complications refers to the total number of complications reported during the interview.
Plausibility refers to the plausibility ratings of the interview.
Manipulation
Participants were or were not exposed to a Model Statement. 
Leal et al. (2019)
Dependent variables
Details refers to the total number of visual and contextual details reported during the interview.
Complications refers to the total number of complications reported during the interview.
Plausibility refers to the plausibility ratings of the interview.
Verifiable sources refers to the total number of verifiable sources reported during the interview.
Manipulation
Participants were or were not exposed to a Ghostwriter or Be Detailed condition.
Vrij, Leal, Deeb, et al. (2020). Experiment 2
Dependent variables
Details refers to the total number of unique details reported throughout the different parts of the interview.
Complications refers to the total number of unique complications reported throughout the different parts of the interview.
Plausibility refers to the plausibility ratings of the entire interview.
Verifiable sources refers to the total number of unique sources reported throughout the different parts of the interview (witness and 
digital sources combined).
Manipulations
Participants were or were not exposed to a Model Statement and were or were not given an Information Protocol.
Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al. (2020)
Dependent variables
Details refers to the total number of unique details reported throughout the different parts of the interview.
Complications refers to the total number of unique complications reported throughout the different parts of the interview (complications 
‘low’ and ‘medium/high’ combined).
Plausibility refers to the plausibility ratings of the entire interview.
Manipulations
Participants were or were not given information to read about the Model Statement technique or the dependent variables ‘complications’, 
‘common knowledge details’ and ‘self-handicapping strategies.
 Deeb et al. (2020)
Dependent variables
Details refers to the total number of unique details reported throughout the three interviews (core and peripheral details combined).
Complications refers to the total number of unique complications reported throughout the three interviews.
Plausibility refers to the plausibility ratings of the three interviews combined.
Manipulation
Participants were or were not asked to sketch while narrating.
